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To discuss the implications of Information Memorandum No. 05‐65, issued on September 14, 2005, in which the NYSE's Division of Enforcement explains to the Exchange community its thinking on the meaning and virtues of corporate cooperation with regulators.

Discusses cooperation in the context of Securities and Exchange Commission Seaboard Report and the Department of Justice Thompson Memorandum; describes the eight standards of “extraordinary cooperation” in the Information Memorandum; and discusses pitfalls such as the lack of any guarantee that a member organization and the exchange will agree on what behavior constitutes extraordinary cooperation, the need to balance prompt reporting of a problem with the need for thorough investigation, and the problem that a member firm may feel pressured to waive attorney‐client privilege to earn “cooperation points.”

The Information Memorandum is noteworthy because it attempts to fit the concept of “creditworthy” cooperation into the framework of a self‐regulatory organization by defining a new goal of “extraordinary cooperation,” and also highlights some of the dicier aspects of the “cooperative” regime under which corporate America has lived for the past four years.

Provides helpful interpretation of NYSE Information Memorandum No. 05‐65 and its implications for a member firm that faces an investigation.